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Jeffrey Fagan
Columbia University
The present study investigates the relation between moral disengagement— one’s willingness to conditionally endorse transgressive behavior—and ongoing offending in a sample of adolescent male felony
offenders (N ⫽ 1,169). In addition, the study attempts to rule out callous– unemotional traits as a third
variable responsible for observed associations between moral disengagement and offending. A bivariate
latent change score analysis suggests that reduction in moral disengagement helps to speed decline in
self-reported antisocial behavior, even after adjusting for the potential confound of callous– unemotional
traits. Declines in moral disengagement are also associated with declining likelihood of offending, based
on official records. Given that both moral disengagement and offending tend to decrease over time, these
findings suggest that changing attitudes toward antisocial behavior contribute to desistance from
offending among delinquent youth.
Keywords: moral disengagement, juvenile offending, adolescence, callous– unemotional traits, longitudinal

youth. We address this question in a sample of adolescent felony
offenders interviewed twice a year for 3 years.

Adolescence is a developmental epoch characterized by important physical, social and psychological changes. It is a time of
questioning social and moral norms (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971),
and for some, violating them; rates of antisocial behavior peak
during this period (Hirschi & Gottfredson, 1983; Piquero, 2008;
Piquero, Farrington, & Blumstein, 2003). One potential contributor to this developmental pattern is the extent to which individuals
view antisocial acts as acceptable or justifiable. The present study
examines the role of attitudes toward antisocial behavior—moral
disengagement—in desistance from offending among delinquent

Moral Disengagement
The social-cognitive theory of moral agency (Bandura, 1986,
1999) proposes that the reason that most people refrain from
transgressing most of the time is that they have internalized society’s standards of conduct. Therefore, acts of wrongdoing risk not
only external sanctions (e.g., disapproval, exclusion, arrest, punishment) but also internal sanctions (e.g., shame, remorse, damage
to one’s self-concept). The theory argues that to avoid internal
sanctions, people construct justifications for behaviors that violate
moral standards, a process called moral disengagement. For example, a person contemplating stealing a video game might tell
him or herself that no one is really hurt by the act or that video
game companies deserve to have their merchandise stolen because
they price it too high. By cognitively reconstruing an antisocial act
to make it seem less wrong or even not wrong, one can circumvent— or disengage—the internal emotional checks that usually
prevent misconduct. Social cognitive theory suggests that moral
disengagement facilitates all sorts of wrongdoing, from the very
minor (e.g., illegally downloading music) to the very major (e.g.,
genocide).
Repeated instances of moral disengagement may lead to routinization of this process (Bandura, 1991). That is, individuals who
frequently rationalize misbehavior may develop stably morally
disengaged attitudes, characterized by general tolerance for moral
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violations1 or an “uncaring and rejecting attitude toward societal
values” (Hyde, Shaw, & Moilanen, 2010, p. 197). Individuals with
morally disengaged attitudes perceive some types of antisocial
behavior as reasonable or justified; for example, they may agree
that “It is all right to fight when your group’s honor is threatened”
and “Some people deserve to be treated like animals” (two items
on Bandura’s Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement Scale).
Empirical evidence suggests that adolescents who more often
endorse these views (i.e., score higher in moral disengagement) are
more likely to engage in antisocial behavior. In studies of children
and adolescents, this form of moral disengagement has been associated with aggression (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996; Pelton, Gound, Forehand, & Brody, 2004), bullying
(Gini, 2006; Hymel, Rocke-Henderson, & Bonanno, 2005), and
delinquency (Bandura et al., 1996; Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli,
Pastorelli, & Regalia, 2001; Pelton et al., 2004). Furthermore, this
association does not appear to be an artifact of shared method
variance; Bandura et al. (1996) reported medium to strong associations between (self-reported) moral disengagement and both
peer and parent ratings of aggression among middle school students; and Gini (2006) noted substantially higher levels of moral
disengagement among peer-nominated bullies compared to victims
and students uninvolved in bullying. Much of the research on
moral disengagement has focused on general adolescent samples
and found moral disengagement to be an important risk factor for
antisocial behavior in this population.
In addition, longitudinal research provides evidence that declines in moral disengagement may contribute to declining levels
of antisocial behavior in the transition to adulthood. For example,
a study that followed a community sample of youth in Italy from
early adolescence into early adulthood found that levels of moral
disengagement (or morally disengaged attitudes) were relatively
high in early adolescence and, for most individuals (89%), declined with age into early adulthood (Paciello, Fida, Tramontano,
Lupinetti, & Caprara, 2008). Furthermore, rates of antisocial behavior tracked levels of moral disengagement, with chronically
aggressive youth exhibiting persistently high levels of moral disengagement and less aggressive youth exhibiting lower levels of
moral disengagement. These findings provide evidence that in
normative populations, high levels of moral disengagement may
help sustain antisocial behavior, whereas declining levels may
foster desistance.

Moral Disengagement Among Delinquent Youth
Identifying predictors of desistance versus persistence in antisocial behavior among delinquent youth is a salient concern for
both theory and policy (Laub & Sampson, 2001). Understanding
what leads to these different outcomes among adolescent offenders
could assist juvenile justice practitioners in distinguishing the
small percentage of youthful offenders who will persist in crime
from the majority who will (largely) abandon it (Mulvey et al.,
2004). Given the evidence of greater antisocial behavior among
those prone to moral disengagement (e.g., Bandura et al., 1996,
2001; Gini, 2006; Paciello et al., 2008; Pelton et al., 2004), it
seems likely that moral disengagement may predict ongoing antisocial behavior among delinquent youth. Though no studies have
conducted comparisons of moral disengagement between demographically matched samples of delinquent and nondelinquent

youth, Kiriakidis (2008) reported higher average levels of moral
disengagement in a sample of youthful male offenders (ages 16 –
21) than those found in a community sample of middle school
students (Bandura et al., 1996). However, the present study is the
first, to our knowledge, to examine the relations between moral
disengagement and offending among delinquent youth over time.
We predict that, as in normative samples of adolescents, morally
disengaged attitudes will facilitate antisocial behavior in this population.

Callous–Unemotional Traits: A Confound on the
Moral Disengagement–Offending Link?
As noted above, the theory of moral disengagement presumes
that individuals have the capacity to experience negative social
emotions such as shame or remorse. In examining the impact of
moral disengagement on offending in a sample of delinquent
youth, we felt it important to consider the possibility that a nontrivial portion of the sample might evince some level of socioemotional dysfunction in the form of callous– unemotional (CU) traits.
Callous individuals, who have attenuated experiences of shame,
remorse, empathy, and other social emotions, have been found to
exhibit low fearfulness and insensitivity to punishment (O’Brien &
Frick, 1996; Pardini, Lochman, & Frick, 2003). These characteristics are thought to interfere with the development of conscience
(Salekin & Frick, 2005) and the internalization of moral standards
of behavior (Blair, 2007; Dienstbier, 1984; Kochanska, 1991).
Critically, it appears that callous individuals are not as able as
others to feel that an act is wrong (Blair, 2007). This deficiency in
the ability to respond emotionally to planned or completed moral
violations means that relatively callous youths are likely to exhibit
permissive attitudes toward wrongdoing, especially when confronted with a potential justification for the act. Consequently,
callous youths are likely to score high on the measure of moral
disengagement used in most research on the topic (including the
present study), which asks youths whether they agree with justifications for various moral violations. Indeed, Hyde et al. (2010)
found that lower empathy (i.e., higher callousness) at age 12
predicts greater moral disengagement at age 15.
Thus, we hypothesize that callousness will be associated with
morally disengaged attitudes, as operationalized in this research.
However, these attitudes among callous youths are not indicative
of real moral disengagement. Relatively callous individuals, because they lack the emotional arsenal required for self-censure,
would not need to morally disengage to commit antisocial acts.
Real moral disengagement hinges on the presence of internal
sanctions and the ability of an individual to feel shame, guilt, and
empathy (Bandura, 1991). Only after repeated efforts to disengage
these internal sanctions does routinized moral disengagement
emerge, according to social-cognitive theory. Accordingly, we
hypothesize that morally disengaged attitudes can arise through
1
We view moral disengagement, as measured in this study, as an
attitude or set of beliefs conceptually similar to techniques of neutralization
(Sykes & Matza, 1957), self-serving cognitive distortions (Gibbs, 1991;
Barriga & Gibbs, 1996), and normative beliefs about aggression (Guerra et
al., 1994; Huesmann & Guerra, 1997). For discussions of the conceptual
similarity of moral disengagement and these other constructs, see Maruna
and Copes (2005) and Barriga, Morrison, Liau, and Gibbs (2001).
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two separate pathways: (a) through repeated instances of disengaging internal sanctions via justification of wrongdoing (i.e., real
moral disengagement), and (b) as a consequence of CU traits.
This issue is particularly salient when studying the relation
between moral disengagement and antisocial behavior in a delinquent sample, which may be more callous, on average, than the
general population. Research on emotional functioning in delinquent youths finds that some— especially those with the most
serious behavior problems— have attenuated (or absent) experiences of social emotions (Caputo, Frick, & Brodsky, 1999; Christian, Frick, Hill, Tyler, & Frazer, 1997; Frick & White, 2008).
Thus, our sample, which includes youths convicted of felony
offenses, is likely to exhibit elevated levels of CU traits.
We view callousness as etiologically distinct from routinized
moral disengagement. Morally disengaged attitudes, which result
from repeated instances of moral disengagement, are likely to
emerge in response to mostly contextual factors, such as observing
others engaging in misconduct, or social pressure to transgress
(Bandura, 1991). Callousness, on the other hand, appears to have
a substantial biological basis. Recent studies of twin pairs suggest
that CU traits are highly heritable, with genetic contributions
explaining 42%– 43% of the variation in this characteristic
(Larsson, Andershed, & Lichtenstein, 2006; Taylor, Loney, Bobadilla, Iacono, & McGue, 2003). Also, environmental factors, such
as parenting, appear to be less strongly related to antisocial conduct among callous than among noncallous children (Oxford,
Cavell, & Hughes, 2003; Wootton, Frick, Shelton, & Silverthorn,
1997).
In summary, we view callousness as conceptually and etiologically distinct from moral disengagement. However, because callousness has been linked to both moral disengagement and offending, it should be treated as a potential confound on the relations
between the last two variables, especially in a sample that is likely
to exhibit elevated levels of callousness. Yet prior research on
moral disengagement and offending has not accounted for the
effects of callousness. We address that omission in this research.

Specific Aims and Plan of Analysis
The present study addresses three specific aims. First, using a
bivariate latent change score (LCS) model (McArdle, 2009;
McArdle & Hamagami, 2004), we investigate the longitudinal
relations between moral disengagement and self-reported offending. On the basis of social-cognitive theory (Bandura, 1991), we
believe that the direction of influence will flow more strongly from
attitudes (moral disengagement) to behavior (offending), than in
the reverse direction. Still, the reciprocal path is important to
consider. Engaging in misconduct may lead one to devalue moral
standards (Hirschi, 1969), which would be evidenced by offending
predicting change in moral disengagement. We test both the main
hypothesized effect and the reciprocal effect by allowing change
from one wave to the next in each variable to be influenced by the
prior level of the other variable.
In LCS models, change in a given variable from one time point
to the next—the latent change score—is not directly calculated.
Rather, it is modeled as difference that accumulates between latent
true scores for adjacent time points. (The latent true scores are the
components of the measured scores that are not a product of
measurement error.) This approach has the advantage of allowing
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for the direct estimation of the degree to which levels of one
variable prospectively predict change over time in another variable. In our case, it allows us to directly test whether level of moral
disengagement at a given time point is related to change in offending between that time point and the next (and vice versa).
These estimates are made while accounting for concurrent associations and other potential sources of correlation between the key
variables, such as similar but independent natural patterns of
change over time. Though these models are correlational and
therefore cannot determine causation, they are an improvement
over other analytic approaches (e.g., cross lag models) in that they
allow for direct modeling of the outcomes of interest—the change
in offending and moral disengagement from one time point to the
next. It is also important to note that the LCS model is fundamentally different from the latent growth curve model, in that the
former is a dynamic system approach: The rate of change in a
given variable is defined at each occasion, based on predictors in
the model, including its prior state and a constant slope representing its growth (McArdle & Hamagami, 2001). Thus, the estimated
latent change in a given variable will vary across different time
points. In contrast, the latent growth curve model is a static
approach; the rate of change is assumed to be time-invariant.
In a bivariate LCS model involving repeated measures of two
variables (X and Y), the latent change scores (⌬x and ⌬y) are
allowed to be influenced by three factors: ⌬y is predicted by (a) the
level of the true score for Y(y) at the start of the interval (the
proportional effect); (b) a constant growth factor (slope) for y; and
(c) (true) the level of the other variable, x, at the start of the interval
(the coupling effect). These predictors of change in y allow for the
estimated trajectory of y to be nonlinear. Correspondingly, ⌬x is
estimated to be influenced by the prior level of x, the slope for x,
and the prior level of y. These effects are estimated while controlling for correlations between concurrent measures of X and Y
(pairings), as well as correlations between the initial levels and
slopes for x and y. Thus, the coupling effects represent conservative estimates of the effect of each variable on change over time in
the other. These coupling effects—the effect of moral disengagement (at time t) on change in self-reported offending (between t
and t ⫹ 6 months), ␥SRO, and the effect of self-reported offending
(at time t) on change in moral disengagement (between t and t ⫹
6 months), ␥MD—are the key parameters of interest in our bivariate LCS model. If the coupling effect of moral disengagement on
change in self-reported offending is significant, it suggests that
moral disengagement is a leading indicator of change in offending.
As the coupling effect is estimated after accounting for incidental
correlations in the way both variables tend to change over time, a
significant estimate is suggestive of a causal effect of one variable
on the other.
In addition, we test whether callousness acts as a confound on
the relation between moral disengagement and self-reported offending. This is accomplished by adding the repeated measures of
callousness (modeled as a latent growth curve) to the LCS model
of moral disengagement and offending. We regress levels of moral
disengagement and offending on concurrent measures of callousness and reexamine the strength of the longitudinal effects of
moral disengagement and offending on one another. Reduction in
these coefficients, compared to the model excluding callousness,
would signal confounding.
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Finally, we examine whether official records of offending are
related to moral disengagement. Given that official records provide
a relatively insensitive measure of offending—the vast majority of
legal infractions go undetected (Brame, Fagan, Piquero, Schubert,
& Steinberg, 2004; Dunford & Elliott, 1984)—we do not expect
moral disengagement to be as strongly related to official records as
to self-reported offending. Still, it is important to examine whether
such a relationship exists because of the concern that the observed
association between moral disengagement and self-reported offending might be an artifact of shared method variance. A bivariate
latent growth model is used to test whether moral disengagement
is statistically related to official records of offending.
All of the models are estimated in a structural equation modeling framework using Mplus (Version 5.21). The models including
self-reported offending are estimated with maximum-likelihood
estimation. Those that include official record of offending are
estimated with a robust weighted least squares estimator, which is
recommended for use with dichotomous dependent variables
(Muthén & Muthén, 2009). Because we expect both self-report and
official record of offending to be influenced by one’s history of
antisocial behavior and by the proportion of time one has been “on the
streets” (i.e., not residing in secure facilities; see Piquero et al., 2001),
we account for both of these factors in our analyses. We initially
considered age as a covariate as well but excluded it in the final
analysis, as it bore no relation to trajectories of moral disengagement.

Method

Procedure
The juvenile court in each locale provided the names of eligible
adolescents (based on age and adjudicated charge). Interviewers
then obtained consent from the participant and a guardian. Interviews were conducted at a facility (if the juvenile was confined),
the juvenile’s home, or a mutually agreed-upon location in the
community. All recruitment and assessment procedures were approved by the institutional review boards of the participating
universities. Adolescents were paid between $50 and $150 per
interview (payments increased at each time point) for their participation, except when facility rules prohibited doing so.
The baseline interview was administered over 2 days in two 2-hr
sessions. Interviewers and participants sat side by side facing a
computer, and questions were read aloud to avoid any problems
caused by reading difficulties. Respondents could answer the questions aloud or, to maximize privacy, enter their responses on a
keypad (although in some facilities, this option was not available).
Attempts were made to conduct interviews out of the earshot of
other individuals. Honest reporting was encouraged by informing
participants of the requirement for confidentiality placed upon us
by the U.S. Department of Justice, which prohibits disclosure of
personally identifiable information except in cases of imminent
danger.
Of those approached, 80% agreed to participate. Participants
were interviewed every 6 months for 36 months. The percentages
of completed interviews among enrolled participants were 93% at
6 months, 93% at 12 months, 91% at 18 months, 91% at 24
months, 91% at 30 months, and 91% at 36 months. Thus, there was
very low attrition of the sample over time.

Participants
Participants were adolescents enrolled in the Pathways to Desistance study, a prospective study of 1,354 serious juvenile offenders (86% male) in Phoenix (N ⫽ 654) and Philadelphia (N ⫽
700). Complete details of the study methodology and its rationale
are provided in Schubert et al. (2004) and Mulvey et al. (2004),
respectively. As the number of female offenders was too small to
provide enough power for the longitudinal multivariate models, we
analyzed only the male offenders (N ⫽ 1,169) for the present study
(excluding the one male participant who was 19 years old at the
initial interview).
Adolescents were eligible for the study if they were 14 –17 years
of age (mean 16.55) at the time of their adjudication and if their
crimes included felony offenses (against persons and property),
certain misdemeanor weapons offenses, or sexual assault. Because
drug law violations represent an especially large proportion of the
offenses committed by this age group, the proportion of male
juveniles with drug offenses was capped at 15% of the sample at
each site to ensure adequate sample heterogeneity with respect to
criminal offending. Participants were interviewed, on average, 36.9
days (SD ⫽ 20.6) after their adjudication (for those in the juvenile
system) or their decertification hearing in Philadelphia or an adult
arraignment in Phoenix (if in the adult system). Participants were
mostly of lower socioeconomic status (less than 8% of the participants
had at least one parent with a 4-year college degree, and 31.6% did not
have a parent with a high-school diploma). The racial/ethnic composition was 42.1% African American, 34.0% Hispanic American,
19.2% non-Hispanic Caucasian, and 4.6% other.

Measures
Moral disengagement. Moral disengagement was assessed at
each time point using the Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement
scale (Bandura et al., 1996). The scale consists of 32 statements
justifying acts of wrongdoing, such as, “Kids who get mistreated
usually do things that deserve it,” “Stealing some money is not too
serious compared to those who steal a lot of money,” and “To hit
obnoxious classmates is just giving them a lesson.” Participants
responded to each statement on a 3-point scale ranging from
disagree to agree, with higher scores indicating greater moral
disengagement. The measure had acceptable internal consistency
(␣ ⫽ .88 at baseline). As in other research on moral disengagement
(Pelton et al., 2004), the items loaded as a single factor in a
principle components analysis and were averaged to compute scale
scores. In the structural equation models that follow, moral disengagement scores were multiplied by 10 for ease of interpretation.
(This type of scaling adjustment has no impact on the relations
among variables.)
Callousness.
Callousness was assessed at each follow-up
interview using the Callous Unemotional dimension of the Youth
Psychopathic Traits Inventory (YPI; Andershed, Kerr, Stattin, &
Levander, 2002), a self-report measure developed to detect psychopathy among youths (␣ ⫽ .71 at the first follow-up interview).
While the YPI is not the measure most commonly used to specifically assess callousness, it has several strengths: (a) It was developed for use with adolescents; (b) the items do not frame callous–
unemotional traits as deficits (e.g., “My emotions are more shallow
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than others’”) but instead as characteristics that should seem
neutral or even appealing to those with psychopathic traits (e.g., “I
usually feel calm when other people are scared”); and (c) it is free
of items that assess antisocial behavior (Andershed et al., 2002).
The Callous Unemotional scale is composed of 15 items tapping
remorselessness (e.g., “I seldom regret things I do, even if other
people feel that they are wrong”), unemotionality (e.g., “I don’t let
my feelings affect me as much as other people’s feelings seem to
affect them”), and callousness (e.g., “It’s important to me not to
hurt other people’s feelings” [reverse coded]). Youths respond on
a 4-point scale ranging from does not apply at all to applies very
well. Scores are calculated as the sum of responses with higher
scores indicating greater emotional deficit. The Callous Unemotional dimension of the YPI is significantly associated with the
conceptually equivalent affective scale of the Psychopathy Checklist—Youth Version (Skeem & Cauffman, 2003) and yields low to
moderate correlations with a variety of self-report conduct problem indices, supporting its convergent validity (Cauffman, Kimonis, Dmitrieva, & Monahan, 2009).
Self-reported offending. At the baseline interview and each
subsequent time point, an adapted version of the Self-Report of
Offending scale (Huizinga, Esbensen, & Weiher, 1991) was used
to assess antisocial behavior. Youths reported whether they had
been involved in 22 types of antisocial and illegal activities (e.g.,
“Taken something from another person by force, using a weapon?”; “Used checks or credit cards illegally?”; “Ever driven while
intoxicated?”) during the 6 months prior to the interview. Antisocial behavior was calculated as the percentage of items a youth
endorsed, with higher scores indicating more antisocial behavior.
Previous research based on this sample has established the reliability of this adapted version of the Self-Report of Offending
scale (Knight, Little, Losoya, & Mulvey, 2004). To reduce the
skewness in the measures of antisocial behavior, these variables
were log transformed.
Lifetime offending. Lifetime offending was assessed using
the same measure of self-reported offending but was based on
youths’ baseline reports of whether they had ever been involved in
the activities described. Lifetime offending was calculated as the
proportion of items a youth endorsed. This variable was used as a
control.
Official record of offending. Participants’ court files were
searched to obtain official records of offending. The data consist of
the number of arrests resulting in a court referral within the 6
months preceding each interview. For the baseline interview, the
count does not include the arrest referral for the current incident.
Because multiple arrests in a given 6-month period were relatively
rare (rates never reach 5% after baseline), the data were dichotomized (any arrests vs. no arrests) for the present analyses.
Opportunity to offend. Many of the participants were limited in their ability to commit the types of offenses included in the
measure of antisocial behavior, due to confinement in a secure
facility (including correctional, psychiatric, drug and alcohol treatment, and residential treatment facilities). To account for dynamic
change in the opportunity to offend due to participants’ movement
in and out of secure settings (Piquero et al., 2001), we used the
proportion of days not spent confined (i.e., time spent on the
streets) since the previous interview as a time-varying covariate of
offending in our analyses. These proportions were ascertained
from a life calendar completed at each interview.
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Missing Data
Coverage—full responses—ranged from 84% to 100% for all
covariances among the study variables except for those including
the 6-month assessment of callousness, which ranged from 73% to
79% because this measure was added after the study began. No
variable had more than 10% missing data, except for the 6-month
assessment of callousness, which was missing for 21% of participants. However, because the elevated rate of missing data on this
assessment was due to study procedures, it was considered to be
missing completely at random. Otherwise, missing data were assumed to be missing at random.2

Results
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for all repeatedly measured variables (in
their raw forms) are shown in Table 1. Concurrent measures of
moral disengagement and callousness were, as expected, moderately to strongly correlated, ranging from .43 to .48 and averaging
.45. Stability, as measured by intraclass correlation, across the
3-year follow-up period (6 months to 36 months) was moderate for
both moral disengagement, 0.42, 95% CI [0.37, 0.47)], and callousness, 0.40, 95% CI [0.34, 0.46)]. Partial correlations of moral
disengagement and callousness with self-report and official record
of offending (controlling for the effects of opportunity to offend)
are shown in Table 2, as is the correlation between self-report and
official record of offending. These reveal consistent, moderate
correlations of moral disengagement and callousness with selfreported offending but only weak, though sometimes significant,
relations between these variables and official record of offending.
While not strong, the significant partial correlations (controlling
for opportunity to offend) between self-report and official record
of offending at each follow-up point (rps range from .19 to .26)
suggests that youths’ self-report of offending is corroborated by
official court record.

Longitudinal Relations Between Moral Disengagement
and Self-Reported Offending
Figure 1 shows a path diagram of the bivariate LCS model used
to analyze the longitudinal relations between moral disengagement
and self-reported offending. In the figure, SRO represents selfreported offending, MD represents moral disengagement and Opp
represents opportunity to offend. Observed variables are represented with squares and latent variables with circles. Singleheaded arrows signify regression paths and double-headed arrows
represent covariance () or, if both ends point to the same variable,
variance. The letter e indicates an error term. Parameters with the
same name are constrained to be equal. Paths marked with 1 are set
to 1. All variables are centered either on their mean or, in the case
of repeatedly measured variables, on their grand mean. Means are
2
We tested whether participants who missed the 36-month interview
(N ⫽ 112) differed from those who completed it in terms of their baseline
levels of moral disengagement, self-reported offending, and lifetime offending or their 6-month levels of callousness. No significant differences
were found. These results will be provided by the authors upon request.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations for All Variables and Stability for Repeatedly Measured Variables
Moral
disengagement
(range: 1–3)
Time point

M

SD

Baseline
6 mo.
12 mo.
18 mo.
24 mo.
30 mo.
36 mo.
Stability

1.63
1.59
1.55
1.52
1.51
1.49
1.48
0.55

(0.35)
(0.37)
(0.36)
(0.38)
(0.37)
(0.36)
(0.36)

Note.

Callousness
(range: 15–60)

Self-reported
offending (%)

Opportunity to
offend
(prop. of time)

Official record of
offending
(prop. arrested)

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

33.77
33.07
32.74
33.08
32.25
32.53
0.49

(6.81)
(6.46)
(6.70)
(6.57)
(6.63)
(6.59)

15.53
9.07
8.01
7.13
6.74
5.28
5.39
0.39

(15.67)
(12.84)
(12.26)
(10.99)
(11.45)
(9.95)
(10.28)

0.52
0.55
0.65
0.66
0.68
0.52
0.55
0.46

(0.41)
(0.42)
(0.41)
(0.41)
(0.41)
(0.41)
(0.42)

0.89
0.16
0.17
0.19
0.22
0.19
0.19
0.08

(0.31)
(0.37)
(0.38)
(0.40)
(0.42)
(0.40)
(0.39)

The stability coefficient is the average Pearson correlation across all assessments. Prop. ⫽ proportion.

estimated for all observed control variables and latent growth
parameters.
Latent change in the key variables (moral disengagement and
self-reported offending) is modeled as arising from three sources: a proportional effect (␤), constant growth (all ␣s ⫽ 1)
emanating from a latent slope (MDs or SROs), and a coupling
effect (␥). Modeling both a proportional and a linear growth
effect allows the pattern of change in each variable to be
curvilinear (see Figure 2). The coupling effects are most important for testing the hypothesis that moral disengagement
affects self-reported offending: ␥SRO represents the effect of
moral disengagement on change in self-reported offending. The
model simultaneously estimates the reciprocal effect (␥MD) of
self-reported offending on change in moral disengagement. In
addition, a latent intercept is estimated for moral disengagement
(MD0) and self-reported offending (SRO0). Covariance between the residuals of moral disengagement and offending at
each time point (the pairing of these variables) is also estimated
(SRO,MD). The coupling, pairing, proportional effect, and intercept parameters are held constant over time, resulting in a
very parsimonious model.
The basic bivariate LCS model includes only 21 freely estimated parameters. However, the present model also accounts
for the covariate effects of (a) lifetime offending on the growth
parameters and (b) opportunity to offend on self-reported offending at each follow-up point. This requires the addition of 24
estimated parameters and results in well-fitting model,

2(207) ⫽ 632.69, p ⬍ .001; CFI ⫽ .94; RMSEA ⫽ .042
(.038 –.046).
The results of this analysis (displayed in Table 3) suggest that
moral disengagement influences change in self-reported offending and, conversely, self-reported offending influences change
in moral disengagement. When these estimates are standardized
(using the model-estimated variance for each observed outcome) it becomes clear that the effect of moral disengagement
on change in self-reported offending (standardized ␥SRO ⫽
1.14, p ⬍ .001) is about 70% stronger than the reciprocal effect
(standardized ␥MD ⫽ – 0.67, p ⬍ .05). Thus, the influence of
moral disengagement on offending appears to be greater than
that of offending on moral disengagement. Because the effects
are on change scores, the positive coefficient for ␥SRO suggests
that as levels of moral disengagement increase, the change
score for offending increases. In other words, higher levels of
moral disengagement are associated with increasing levels of
offending, whereas lower levels of moral disengagement are
associated with declining levels of offending. The negative
estimate for ␥MD indicates that higher earlier levels of offending at a given point are associated with subsequent decreases in
moral disengagement—a somewhat counterintuitive finding
that we discuss later.
Bear in mind that these estimates are made after accounting
for other effects in the model, such as the patterns of growth in
moral disengagement and offending, both of which had negative slopes, and the covariance between concurrent measures of

Table 2
Concurrent Partial Correlations With Self-Reported Offending and Official Record of Offending, Controlling for Opportunity to
Offend
Partial correlation

6 month

With self-reported offending
Moral disengagement
Callousness
Official record of offending
With official record of offending
Moral disengagement
Callousness
ⴱ

p ⬍ .05.

ⴱⴱ

p ⬍ . 01.

ⴱⴱⴱ

p ⬍ .001.

.33ⴱⴱⴱ
.27ⴱⴱⴱ
.19ⴱⴱⴱ
.02
⫺.01

12 month

18 month

24 month

30 month

36 month

.30ⴱⴱⴱ
.31ⴱⴱⴱ
.25ⴱⴱⴱ

.34ⴱⴱⴱ
.30ⴱⴱⴱ
.26ⴱⴱⴱ

.30ⴱⴱⴱ
.30ⴱⴱⴱ
.22ⴱⴱⴱ

.33ⴱⴱⴱ
.24ⴱⴱⴱ
.22ⴱⴱⴱ

.29ⴱⴱⴱ
.24ⴱⴱⴱ
.25ⴱⴱⴱ

.04
.03

.09ⴱⴱ
.07ⴱ

.02
.08ⴱ

.12ⴱⴱⴱ
.08ⴱ

.07ⴱ
.09ⴱⴱ
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Figure 1. Bivariate latent change score model of moral disengagement (MD) and self-reported offending
(SRO), controlling lifetime offending (LO) and opportunity to offend (Opp). Not illustrated is a single
covariance estimate for lifetime offending with each measure of opportunity to offend. Though shown only once,
the pairing of MD and SRO (SRO,MD) is estimated based on the covariance at each time point. Observed
variables are represented with squares and latent variables with circles. Single-headed arrows signify regression
paths and double-headed arrows represent covariance () or, if both ends point to the same variable, variance.
The letter e indicates an error term. Parameters with the same name are constrained to be equal. Paths marked
with 1 are set to 1. All variables are centered on either their mean or, in the case of repeatedly measured
variables, their grand mean. Means are estimated for all observed control variables and latent growth parameters.

moral disengagement and offending (SRO,MD), which was positive (r ⫽ .32, p ⬍ .001). The average trajectories for both
moral disengagement and offending declined in a curvilinear
fashion (see Figure 2). As expected, the intercepts of these
variables were positively associated with lifetime offending.

Testing Whether Callousness Is a Confound
To ensure that the observed relations between moral disengagement and offending were not a result of callousness giving rise to
both, the model was reestimated with callousness partialled. To
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Figure 2. Estimated trajectories of self-reported offending (SRO; upper panel) and moral disengagement (MD;
lower panel) for individuals with different initial levels of the other variable. BL ⫽ baseline time point.

account for the effects of callousness on both self-reported offending and moral disengagement, we added the repeated measures of
callousness, specified as evincing linear growth, to the model.
Paths were added to the model regressing the observed moral
disengagement and offending variables on the observed callousness variables, with these estimates held constant over time. In
addition, the latent intercept and slope terms for callousness were
allowed to covary with the growth parameters for moral disengagement and self-reported offending, as well as with lifetime
offending. (See Figure 3 for a simplified illustration of this model
and its results.) Thus, 18 new, freely estimated parameters were
added to the model, which had good fit, 2(342) ⫽ 817.04, p ⬍
.001; CFI ⫽ .95; RMSEA ⫽ .034 (.031–.038). The growth parameter estimates for callousness, reported in Table 3, show that, on
average, callousness tended to decline over time after accounting
for correlations between its growth parameters and those of moral
disengagement and self-reported offending.
As predicted, the repeated measures of callousness were significantly related to the repeated measures of both moral disengagement (standardized estimate ⫽ .20, p ⬍ .001) and offending
(standardized estimate ⫽ .06, p ⬍ .001). However, the longitudinal
associations between moral disengagement and offending were not

substantively attenuated in this model compared to the prior model
excluding callousness. The estimated influence of moral disengagement on change in self-reported offending was nearly identical to the prior model, as was the estimated effect of self-reported
offending on change in moral disengagement (see Table 3 and
Figure 3).
To statistically test whether either coupling effect, ␥SRO or ␥MD,
had changed significantly as a result of adding callousness to the
model, we set each path (one at a time) equal to its weight in the
previous model that did not include callousness. If the path had
changed significantly from the previous model, doing this would
cause a significant increase in the chi-square. The results showed
that neither path’s weight changed significantly as a result of
adding callousness to the model: ⌬2(1) for ␥SRO ⫽ 0.08, p ⫽ ns;
⌬2(1) for ␥MD ⫽ 0.27, p ⫽ ns). A similar test of the residual
correlation for concurrent measures of moral disengagement and
self-reported offending (SRO,MD) indicated that this parameter
was also not significantly reduced compared to the previous
model, ⌬2(1) for SRO,MD ⫽ 0.56, p ⫽ ns. Thus, it does not
appear that callousness acts as a confound on the longitudinal or
concurrent associations between moral disengagement and offending.
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Table 3
Results of Latent Difference Score Models Examining Longitudinal Effects of Moral Disengagement (MD) and Self-Reported
Offending (SRO) on One Another
Model without callousness
Model parameters
Effects on change estimates (coupling)
⌬SRO on latent MD
⌬MD on latent SRO
Autoproportion effects
⌬SRO on latent SRO
⌬MD on latent MD
Growth parameters (intercepts)
SRO intercept
SRO slope
MD intercept
MD slope
CU intercept
CU slope
Growth parameters (variance)
SRO intercept
SRO slope
MD intercept
MD slope
CU intercept
CU slope
Covariance parameters
SRO(t) with MD(t) (Pairing)
SRO intercept, slope
MD intercept, slope
SRO intercept, MD intercept
SRO slope, MD slope
SRO intercept, MD slope
SRO slope, MD intercept
CU intercept, slope
CU intercept, SRO intercept
CU intercept, SRO slope
CU intercept, MD intercept
CU intercept, MD slope
CU slope, SRO intercept
CU slope, SRO slope
CU slope, MD intercept
CU slope, MD slope
Opportunity, SRO intercept
Effects of control variables
SRO intercept on Lifetime Offending
SRO slope on Lifetime Offending
MD intercept on Lifetime Offending
MD slope on Lifetime Offending
SRO(t) on Opportunity
SRO(t) on CU(t)
MD(t) on CU(t)

Sym

Model with callousness

B

CI lower

CI upper

B

CI lower

CI upper

␥SRO
␥MD

0.486ⴱⴱ
⫺0.691ⴱ

0.125
⫺1.335

0.847
⫺0.046

0.445ⴱⴱ
⫺0.561ⴱ

0.180
⫺1.009

0.710
⫺0.114

␤SRO
␤MD

⫺1.118ⴱⴱⴱ
0.216

⫺1.589
⫺0.184

⫺0.648
0.615

⫺1.054ⴱⴱⴱ
0.129

⫺1.388
⫺0.165

⫺0.720
0.423

SRO0
SROs
MD0
MDs

0.853ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺0.150ⴱⴱⴱ
0.931ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺0.248ⴱⴱⴱ

0.794
⫺0.233
0.738
⫺0.306

0.913
⫺0.066
1.125
⫺0.190

0.857ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺0.151ⴱⴱⴱ
0.879ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺0.240ⴱⴱⴱ
0.828ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺0.236ⴱⴱⴱ

0.799
⫺0.223
0.697
⫺0.284
0.430
⫺0.316

0.915
⫺0.078
1.062
⫺0.195
1.226
⫺0.155

SROⴱ0
SROsⴱ
MDⴱ0
MDsⴱ

0.061
1.338
6.031ⴱⴱⴱ
0.401

⫺0.029
⫺0.467
5.187
⫺0.481

0.151
3.143
6.875
1.282

0.062
1.073
5.529
0.245
25.623ⴱⴱⴱ
0.503ⴱⴱⴱ

⫺0.027
⫺0.024
4.755
⫺0.129
21.687
0.339

0.151
2.169
6.303
0.619
29.560
0.667

0.224ⴱⴱⴱ
0.119ⴱ
⫺1.111
0.034
0.655
0.071
⫺2.341ⴱ

0.158
0.023
⫺3.088
⫺0.140
⫺0.738
⫺0.011
⫺4.273

0.291
0.215
0.867
0.207
2.048
0.152
⫺0.408

0.009

⫺0.011

0.028

0.200ⴱⴱⴱ
0.113ⴱⴱ
⫺0.671
0.050
0.408
0.055
⫺1.929ⴱⴱ
⫺1.499ⴱⴱⴱ
0.202
⫺0.960ⴱ
4.246ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺0.229
0.034
⫺0.024
⫺0.042
0.053
0.008

0.138
0.037
⫺1.961
⫺0.111
⫺0.361
⫺0.002
⫺3.186
⫺2.189
⫺0.184
⫺1.901
3.112
⫺1.089
⫺0.047
⫺0.121
⫺0.273
⫺0.014
⫺0.011

0.262
0.189
0.620
0.212
1.178
0.112
⫺0.671
⫺0.809
0.587
⫺0.019
5.380
0.632
0.115
0.073
0.189
0.120
0.027

3.259
⫺0.614
5.430
⫺0.274
0.197

3.797
0.829
6.986
0.777
0.358

3.552ⴱⴱⴱ
0.375
5.554ⴱⴱⴱ
0.363ⴱ
0.272ⴱⴱⴱ
0.013ⴱⴱⴱ
0.108ⴱⴱⴱ

3.283
⫺0.092
4.797
0.013
0.194
0.007
0.095

3.821
0.841
6.311
0.712
0.350
0.019
0.121

SRO,MD
SRO0,SROs
MD0,MDs
MD0,SRO0
SROs,MDs
SRO0,MDs
MD0,SROs

εSRO0
εSROs
εMDs
εMD0
␦

ⴱⴱⴱ

3.528
0.108
6.208ⴱⴱⴱ
0.252
0.278ⴱⴱⴱ

Note. “Sym” ⫽ the symbol for the parameter as labeled in Figure 1; CU ⫽ callous– unemotional traits; SRO ⫽ self-reported offending; MD ⫽ moral
disengagement. The shorthand “Y on X” signifies a regression path and “Y, X” signifies covariance. In the interest of space, means and variances for
repeated measures are omitted.
ⴱ
p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.

Moral Disengagement and Official Record of
Offending
To confirm that the relations between moral disengagement and
offending were not due merely to shared method variance, we estimated an additional model investigating the relations between moral
disengagement and official record of offending (coded as a dichotomous variable) for the six follow-up time points.3 A bivariate LCS

3
The baseline interview was excluded because, while we had official
records for the 6 months preceding baseline, we had no ability to account
for opportunity to offend during this period. This is a bigger problem when
modeling official record offending than when modeling self-reported offending, which is less dependent on confinement.
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Figure 3. Simplified version of the latent change score model including callousness (CU) as a potential
confound. The model is only displayed out to the third time point (12 months); the nondisplayed parts of the
model are redundant. Unstandardized estimates are shown. Where two estimates are shown, the top one refers
to the model without callousness and the bottom one refers to the model including callousness. Paths with the
same name are constrained to be equal. a p ⬍ .05. b p ⬍ .01. c p ⬍ .001.

model could not be used because it would not converge. Instead,
growth models were estimated for both variables and relations
among them examined. On the basis of pretesting of no-growth,
linear, and quadratic growth models—specifically, by comparing
the Bayesian information criterion fit statistics for each model—
quadratic growth was specified for both variables. For official
offending, the quadratic term was fixed (i.e., the variance was set
equal to zero), because its variance was nonsignificant. The control
variables of lifetime offending and opportunity to offend were
added to the model, with the latter being partialled from the
observed measures of official offending at each time point. Growth
parameters were allowed to correlate, and a single covariance was
estimated between opportunity to offend and the intercept for
official offending. To model covariance in the residuals of concurrent measures, official offending was regressed on concurrent
measures of moral disengagement and vice versa. (Regression
paths are used instead of correlations because covariances between
binary and continuous variables cannot be specified in Mplus.)
Means were estimated for all observed control variables and for all
latent growth parameters except the intercept of official offending,
which was fixed at zero. This model is illustrated in Figure 4.
This model had good fit, 2(169) ⫽ 339.44, p ⬍ .001; CFI ⫽
.95; RMSEA ⫽ .029 (.025–.034), and revealed significant corre-

lations between some of the growth parameters for moral disengagement and official offending (see Table 4). Most importantly,
the slopes were correlated (r ⫽ .27, p ⬍ .05), meaning that as one
variable declined, so did the other.4 However, after accounting for
the correlations between the growth parameters, no additional
covariance was detected between the residuals for the repeated
measures of moral disengagement and offending. Neither the estimated effect of offending on concurrent moral disengagement
nor of moral disengagement on concurrent offending differed
significantly from zero. Though these results do not constitute
evidence of a causal relation between moral disengagement and
official record of offending, the significant correlation between the
slope estimates suggests a statistical relation between moral dis-

4
Also, the intercept (at 6 months) for offending was correlated inversely
with the slope (r ⫽ –.25, p ⬍ .05) and directly with the quadratic term (r ⫽
.25, p ⬍ .05) of moral disengagement, meaning that those more likely to be
arrested at that time point tended to have a different shape to their
trajectory change over time in moral disengagement. However, correlations
with intercept terms are unreliable because they vary depending upon
where (in time) one sets the intercept (Rogosa & Willet, 1985).
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Figure 4. Bivariate latent growth curve model of moral disengagement (MD) and official record of offending
(ORO), controlling for opportunity to offend (Opp) and lifetime offending (LO). Unstandardized estimates are
shown. For simplicity, shorthand is used to represent the relations between the growth parameters (intercept [0],
slope [s], and quadratic [q]) and the observed measures of moral disengagement and official record of offending.
2
Parameters with the same name are constrained to be equal. Residual variance estimates ORO122 through ORO36
did not differ from zero. Not shown is the covariance between the intercept of ORO and the repeated measures
of Opp. ⴱ p ⬍ .05. ⴱⴱ p ⬍ .01. ⴱⴱⴱ p ⬍ .001.

engagement and offending that cannot be attributed to shared
method variance.
Regarding the effects of the control variables, official offending
was more likely among those with greater opportunity to offend.
Also, lifetime offending was directly related to the intercepts of
official record and moral disengagement but not to the other
growth parameters.

Discussion
Are morally disengaged attitudes a cause, a consequence, or a
mere correlate of offending among delinquent youth? Our findings
provide evidence for these attitudes being both correlated with and
predictive of offending. As both moral disengagement and offending tend to decline over time in this sample, it is more accurate to

say that, controlling for history of offending and time spent in
secure confinement, becoming less tolerant of moral violations
helps delinquent youth desist from antisocial behavior. While a
nonexperimental study cannot provide definitive evidence of causality, our use of a model that accounts for correlations in the
concurrent measures and developmental patterns of both variables
while estimating the longitudinal relations between the two provides reasonable evidence of influence (McArdle, 2009). The size
of this effect is substantial; it translates to a 1.14 standard deviation
decline (on average) in log offending over a given 6-month period
for every standard deviation decrease in moral disengagement at
its start. Furthermore, this longitudinal relation persists even after
accounting for the significant effects of callousness on both moral
disengagement and self-reported offending. Our finding that
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Table 4
Estimated Covariances Among the Growth Parameters for Official Record of Offending (ORO) and Moral Disengagement (MD)
Variable 1

Variable 2

B

CI lower

CI upper

rp

ORO intercept

ORO slope
MD intercept
MD slope
MD quadratic
MD intercept
MD slope
MD quadratic
MD slope
MD quadratic
MD quadratic

⫺0.176
⫺0.179
⫺0.210
0.048
0.127
0.116
⫺0.022
0.318
⫺0.122
⫺0.110

⫺0.450
⫺0.755
⫺0.397
0.004
⫺0.073
0.013
⫺0.045
0.095
⫺0.173
⫺0.136

0.098
0.397
⫺0.024
0.093
0.328
0.219
0.000
0.541
⫺0.071
⫺0.084

⫺0.233
0.048
⫺0.248ⴱ
0.252ⴱ
0.183
0.270ⴱ
⫺0.265
0.112ⴱⴱ
⫺0.266ⴱⴱⴱ
⫺0.862ⴱⴱⴱ

ORO slope
MD intercept
MD slope
ⴱ

p ⬍ .05.

ⴱⴱ

p ⬍ .01.

ⴱⴱⴱ

p ⬍ .001.

change in moral disengagement is also associated with change in
official record of offending provides some assurance that the
study’s main findings are not a result of shared method variance.
Thus, we conclude that attitudes toward wrongdoing seem to play
a role in juvenile offenders’ desistance from antisocial behavior.
However, these attitudes are a moving target. Our study also
demonstrates that moral disengagement tends to decline over time
in this sample. Whether this decline is indicative of developmental
change is not something that we can determine from these data.
Prior research suggests that moral disengagement declines between adolescence and early adulthood in normative samples of
adolescents (Paciello et al., 2008). Although our sample spanned
this age range, our preliminary models did not identify age differences in the levels or patterns of change in moral disengagement.
If the decline in moral disengagement were developmental, we
would have expected the younger participants to exhibit higher
levels of moral disengagement than the older participants.
The failure to find this developmental pattern is not, however,
evidence that delinquent youth are less subject than their nondelinquent peers to developmental processes that might influence
change in moral disengagement. To test this, one would need to
sample randomly from a population of delinquent youth. The
sample selection in the present study was not random; youths were
enrolled soon after being convicted (or adjudicated guilty) of a
felony offense. Given the association between moral disengagement and antisocial behavior, this likely resulted in youths being
enrolled during a peak point in their personal developmental
trajectories of moral disengagement. If this were the case, then the
pattern of decline in moral disengagement could reflect normative
psychosocial maturational processes, such as increased selfefficacy and self-regulatory capacity, which have been used to
explain developmental decreases in moral disengagement in community samples of adolescents (Paciello et al., 2008). Another
interesting possibility is that changes in participants’ social contexts, perhaps even as a result of the justice system’s response to
the youths’ crimes, account for this decline in moral disengagement. Understanding what contributes to this change in delinquent
youths’ attitudes toward wrongdoing is a worthwhile aim for
future studies. Already, some research suggests that social contextual factors such as parenting style and neighborhood conditions
may influence moral disengagement (Hyde et al., 2010; Pelton et
al., 2004). Regardless of its cause, this decline in moral disengage-

ment may be one reason (among many) why a large proportion of
youth in the sample desist from offending (Mulvey et al., 2010).
An unexpected finding emerging from the analysis is that the
estimated impact of self-reported offending on change in moral
disengagement is inverse. That is, higher levels of offending
portend decreases in moral disengagement. The size of this effect,
however, is relatively small—an average 0.25 standard deviation
decrease in moral disengagement for every one standard deviation
increase in log offending. The notion that offending would lead to
greater sensitivity to moral violations is contrary to extant theory
and literature on the relations between attitudes toward crime and
engagement in it (e.g., Barriga & Gibbs, 1996; Gibbs, 1991;
Guerra, Huesmann, & Hanish, 1994; Hirschi, 1969; Huesmann &
Guerra, 1997), which views these processes as mutually reinforcing. Although other factors that were not accounted for in this
study might explain this finding, we are hesitant to draw too much
attention to it because of its peculiarity and small size; thus, further
research is needed to sort this finding out. Nevertheless, it is
important to bear in mind that our findings indicate that concurrent
measures of moral disengagement and offending are positively
correlated.
Consistent with our theory that callousness would encourage
tolerant attitudes toward wrongdoing and facilitate offending, CU
traits were strongly correlated with moral disengagement and
moderately correlated with self-reported offending. However, our
findings do not indicate that callousness serves as a confound on
the longitudinal relations between moral disengagement and offending. Even after partialling callousness from each measure of
the other two constructs and allowing its growth parameters to be
correlated with those of moral disengagement and offending, the
longitudinal relations between moral disengagement and offending
remain largely unaltered. This finding suggests that the contribution of callousness to antisocial behavior is distinct from that of
moral disengagement, in spite of the association between these
variables. Thus, the results support the idea that morally disengaged attitudes can emerge from two discrete sources: (a) a history
of disengaging internal sanctions or (b) emotional dysfunction. To
the extent they reflect the former, morally disengaged attitudes are
predictive of antisocial behavior.
Additionally, it is worth noting that callousness, which, as
mentioned previously, shows evidence in other studies of having a
considerable biological basis, was no more stable across the 3-year
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follow-up than moral disengagement, which is posited to emerge
from experiential factors (Bandura, 1991). If anything, callousness
appeared to be slightly less stable and, like moral disengagement,
it tended to decline over time. Thus, at least some of the youth in
the study who showed symptoms of callousness early in the study
do not appear to be incapable of experiencing social emotions.
Instead, their apparent emotional dysfunction early on may have
been a response to their recent experiences—including commitment of a felony offense, reactions of friends and family to the act,
and subsequent interaction with the justice system. As discussed
by Frick and White (2008), stability in a characteristic (be it
callousness or moral disengagement) does not necessarily imply
biological determinism or implacability. It could, instead reflect
stability in the social contextual factors that support the characteristic. Therefore, the levels of stability in callousness and moral
disengagement do not provide insight into the degree to which
these dispositions reflect genetic predispositions or responses to
the environment, or how much they might be alterable through
intervention.
This study has several strengths, including its large sample size,
longitudinal design, and high retention rate. The use of a large,
multisite sample of juvenile offenders reduces the risk of finding
regionally specific relations among key variables. Also, our use of
an LCS approach to the analysis enabled us to directly model our
hypotheses about the dynamic relations over time between moral
disengagement and self-reported offending. Though the official
records of offending did not provide enough information for us to
employ the same model as we used to analyze self-reported offending, we were able to confirm that our two sources of offending
information were statistically related and that moral disengagement was associated with both. Nevertheless, caution should be
used in interpreting the results. One caveat is that the results from
the LCS models may be inflated due to shared method variance.
Another is that the analyses do not account for the effects of
treatment services youth may have received subsequent to adjudication. In addition, we did not control for other potentially important factors (e.g., variation in youth’s social contexts, such as
residence, school, employment, or peer groups). Future studies
may want to account for these factors in order to provide a more
complete picture of moral disengagement and its relation to behavior among delinquent youth. Also, the role of opportunity to
offend could be explored in greater depth in future research by
incorporating this measure into the dynamic systems model (along
with moral disengagement and offending) rather than treating it as
a covariate of offending.
In conclusion, moral disengagement appears to serve as a leading indicator of change in antisocial conduct among adolescent
offenders. Reduction over time in moral disengagement may therefore help explain why most adolescent offenders “recover” from
crime rather than become lifelong criminals. Future studies should
investigate the causes of change in moral disengagement in delinquent male populations. In particular, this research should explore
the impact of environmental factors (e.g., neighborhood and peer
context) and specific experiences (e.g., incarceration, parenthood,
employment) on moral disengagement. It would also be useful
investigate whether the same patterns hold for female offenders
and whether interventions that target moral disengagement might
be effective in reducing recidivism.
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